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ANTITRUST LAW- STANDING - DIRECT PURCHASERS FROM DEFEN-
DANTS' COMPETITORS LACK STANDING TO BRING TREBLE DAMAGE
ACTION; INDIRECT PURCHASERS FROM DEFENDANTS HAVE STANDING
TO SEEK INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc. (1979)
Five corporations involved in the manufacture and sale of consumer
bags 1 were sued for alleged price fixing in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act 2 by a group of private plaintiffs seeking treble damages under
section 43 and injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act.4 Plain-
tiffs fell into three categories: 1) indirect purchasers in the defendants' chain
of distribution; 5 '2) direct purchasers from one of the defendants' com-
petitors; 6 and 3) direct purchasers from a subsidiary of one of the de-
fendants. 7 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
1. Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 575-76 (3d Cir.
1979). The five defendant corporations were Continental Group, Inc., American Bag & Paper
Corp., Chase Bag Co., Harley Corp., and St. Regis Paper Co. Id. at 576.
2. Id. at 575. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section I of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent
part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." Id. The civil actions comprising the instant case were instituted after a grand jury
indictment had charged the defendants with price fixing in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
596 F.2d at 575. See United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Pa.
1978). In addition to the criminal actions, the government sought injunctive relief and several
direct purchasers from the defendants sued for treble damages as well as injunctive relief. See
generally 596 F.2d at 575 n.1.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part: "Any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained .. " Id.
4. Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d at 575-76. See 15
U.S.C. § 26 (1976). Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties,
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, . . when and
under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct
that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity. ...
Id.
5. 596 F.2d at 575. This group consisted of supermarkets and retail groceries that did not
purchase consumer bags directly, but purchased products packaged in consumer bags. Id.
6. Id. at 575-76. Although plaintiff Murray's of Baederwood, Inc. (Murray's) admittedly did
not purchase bags directly from the defendants, evidence suggested that one of its suppliers,
most of whom were middlemen and wholesalers, may have also manufactured bags. Id. at
575-76. For the purpose of reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment against
plaintiffs, the Third Circuit considered Murray's to be a direct purchaser from a competitor of
the defendants. Id. at 580 n.25.
7. Id. at 576. Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. (Mid-West) purchased bags from Great Plains
Bag Co., a subsidiary of defendant Continental Group, Inc. Id. A factual question existed as to
whether the bags purchased from the subsidiary were of the type plaintiffs claimed were the
subject of the price-fixing agreement. Id. at 588.
In response to the defendants' legal argument that Mid-West did not purchase directly
from it, the Third Circuit noted that, under certain circumstances, a parent corporation can be
(967)
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Pennsylvania granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, apparently
concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an antitrust action. 8 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 9 affirmed the dismissal
of the treble damage actions brought by defendants' indirect purchasers and
by the competitor's direct purchasers, 10 reversed the dismissal of the actions
for injunctive relief," and remanded the question of whether plaintiff
Mid-West Paper Products Co. (Mid-West) had purchased consumer bags di-
rectly from one of the defendants through the defendant's subsidiary. 12 The
court held that neither defendants' indirect purchasers nor the competitor's
direct purchasers have standing to bring actions for treble damages, but that
indirect purchasers may seek injunctive relief. Mid-West Paper Products Co.
v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
The Clayton Act authorizes private parties to seek judicial remedies
against antitrust violators through actions for treble damages under section
4 13 and actions for injunctive relief under section 16.14 In treble damage
actions involving price fixing, the United States Supreme Court has limited
the class of potential plaintiffs by concluding that, within a defendant's chain
of distribution, only direct purchasers suffer legal injury. 15
In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,'18 the Supreme
Court allowed the plaintiff direct purchaser to recover the full amount of the
overcharge resulting from defendant's price fixing, despite the contention
held legally accountable for its subsidiary's actions. Id. at 589. As the Court stated: "[W]here
stock ownership is resorted to for the purpose of controlling a subsidiary so that it may be used
as *a mere agency or instrumentality' of the parent," the courts will disregard the subsidiary
corporate entity. P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261, 266 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 926 (1970), quoting Chicago M. & St. P. By. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce
Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490, 501 (1918).
8. See 596 F.2d at 576. Although not accompanied by an opinion, the district court's dis-
missal was ciearly based on the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720 (1977). See 596 F.2d at 576. For a discussion of Illinois Brick, see notes 21-24 and
accompanying text infra.
9. The case was heard by judges Aldisert, Adams, and Higginbotham. Judge Adams wrote
the majority opinion. Judge Higginbotham dissented in part.
10. 596 F.2d at 578-87.
11. Id. at 589-94.
12. Id. at 587-89.
13. For the pertinent text of § 4, see note 3 supra.
14. For the pertinent text of § 16, see note 4 supra. The Supreme Court has construed §§ 4
and 16 as indicative of a congressional purpose to encourage enforcement of the antitrust laws
by "private attorneys general." See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
15. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. Uni-
ted Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). On the facts of these cases, the Court's
restrictive analysis of legal injury applied only to purchasers within the defendant's chain of
distribution. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 726 (indirect purchasers from defend-
ant lack standing); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach, Corp., 392 U.S. at 494 (direct
purchaser's damages equal to amount of overcharge). In apparently favoring direct purchasers,
the Illinois Brick Court recognized that others who have been injured will go uncompensated,
but suggested that attempts to allocate damages and compensate each victim for actual losses
would be ineffective. 431 U.S. at 746-47.
16. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
[VOL. 25: p. 967
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that subsequent purchasers had, in fact, borne the loss.' 7 Defendant was
barred from asserting the defense that plaintiff was not injured because it
had "passed on" the illegal overcharge to its own customers.' The Court
was unwilling to complicate treble damage actions with the complex
economic analysis necessary to trace the effects of the overcharge, 19 and
wanted to provide incentive to enforce the antitrust laws by concentrating
recovery in one group of plaintiffs.
2 0
Having foreclosed the use of passing-on as a defense, the Supreme
Court, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,2 ' similarly prohibited the use of that
theory as an offensive tactic,2 2 holding that indirect purchasers can not assert
claims based on the passed-on overcharge. 23 The Court concluded that mul-
17. Id. at 494. In Hanover Shoe, the plaintiff, a shoe manufacturer, had leased equipment
from the defendant, a major manufacturer of shoe machinery. See id. at 483. Alleging that the
defendant had monopolized the shoe industry by leasing, rather than selling, its machinery, the
plaintiff sued for treble damages based upon the difference between the price it had paid in
machinery rentals and what it would have paid had the defendant been willing to sell its
machines. Id. at 483-84. Defendant claimed that the plaintiff had suffered no legal injury be-
cause plaintiff had passed on the overcharge to its customers in the prices charged for shoes. Id.
at 487-88.
18. id. at 488. The "passing on" theory involves situations in which an antitrust violator or
an indrect purchaser from the antitrust violator claims that the illegal overcharge has been
"passed on" through the direct purchaser's chain of distribution. Id. The passing on of damages
was discussed by the Supreme Court as early as 1918. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-
Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918). See generally Pollock, Standing to Sue, Remoteness
of Injury, and the Passing-on Doctrine, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 19-40 (1966).
19. 392 U.S. at 492-93. Discussing pricing policies and defensive passing-on, the Court em-
phasized that because "[a] wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies," treble
damage actions permitting passing-on as a defense would entail "long and complicated proceed-
ings involving massive evidence and complicated theories." Id.
20. Id. at 494. The Court reasoned that, if the passing-on defense were available against
each purchaser in the distribution chain, each would often "have only a tiny stake in the lawsuit
and little interest in [suing]." Id. For a discussion of the problems of class actions under § 4,
see Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The
Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1971).
21. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
22. Id. at 728. Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Illinois Brick, the offensive use of
passing-on had received conflicting treatment by the lower courts. Compare Illinois v. Ampress
Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720 (1977) (purchasers of buildings had standing to sue manufacturers of concrete block for
unlawful prices charged masonry and general contractors who incorporated blocks in buildings)
and In re Western Liquid Asphalt cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom.
Standard Oil Co. v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 919 (1974) (public consumers of liquid asphalt had stand-
ing to sue suppliers for unlawful prices charged consumers' contractors) with Mangano v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), afj'g
Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D.
Pa. 1970) (homeowners, commercial building owners, and apartment building owners denied
standing to sue plumbing fixture manufacturers for unlawful prices charged plumbing wholesal-
ers) and Fields Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970) (per
curiam), afJfg 318 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971) (motion
picture producer denied standing to sue motion picture distributor for damages to television
stations and other distributors from illegal tying agreement).
23. 431 U.S. at 728. In Illinois Brick, the State of Illinois and 700 local governmental en-
tities in the Chicago area brought a treble damage action against a group of manufacturers and
distributors of concrete blocks. Id. at 726. Plaintiffs were indirect purchasers, having bought
1979-1980]
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tiple liability and complex tracing of the overcharge can best be avoided if
both plaintiffs and defendants are precluded from asserting passing-on.
24
Limited exceptions to the disallowance of the use of the passing-on
theory have been recognized. 2 5 One exception, noted by the Supreme
Court, is where a preexisting, fixed-quantity, cost-plus contract exists, ob-
viating the need to trace the overcharge since, by the terms of the contract,
the direct purchaser's customer absorbs the entire overcharge by purchasing
at a fixed amount over the direct purchaser's cost. 26 A second set of cir-
cumstances suggested by the court as a situation in which the passing-on
defense might be permitted is "where the direct purchaser is owned or con-
trolled by its customer." 2 7 Adding a third exception, the Third Circuit held,
in Stotter & Co. v. Arnstar Corp.,28 that the Illinois Brick proscription of
from general contractors buildings constructed with blocks purchased from the defendants. Id.
Plaintiffs alleged injury due to all or part of the overcharge passed on to them through the
masonry and general contractors. Id. at 727.
24. Id. at 730-33. The Illinois Brick Court, in concluding that it would be unfair to permit
plaintiffs to assert passing-on offensively while denying defendants the use of passing-on as a
defense, foresaw the risk of multiple liability if, as under Hanover Shoe, only the defendants
were barred from asserting passing-on. id. at 730. In such a situation, a direct purchaser could
recover the full amount of damages, including the passed-on overcharge for which an indirect
purchaser had already collected; or an indirect purchaser could recover the portion of the over-
charge passed on to it although the direct purchaser had already recovered the full overcharge.
Id. In addition, the complexity of a case would be increased if, because the plaintiff was several
steps removed from the defendant, the court had to trace the overcharge through each step of
the distribution chain. Id. at 732.
Allowing both plaintiffs and defendants the use of passing-on would require apportionment
of the overcharge among all potential plaintiffs. Id. at 737. In this kind of situation, the Court
was concerned that joinder of parties from all levels of the distribution chain would be encour-
aged, adding even greater complexity to and further reducing the effectiveness of antitrust ac-
tions. Id. at 737-44.
25. See generally Note, Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall: The Future of Indirect Purchasers in
Antitrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 327-32 (1978).
26. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 735-36; Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. at 494. The Supreme Court explained the effect of a preexisting, fixed-
quantity, cost-plus arrangement, stating that
[i]n such a situation, the [seller] is insulated from any decrease in its sales as a result of
attempting to pass on the overcharge, because its customer is committed to buying a fixed
quantity regardless of price. The effect of the overcharge is essentially determined in
advance, without reference to the interaction of supply and demand that complicates the
determination in the general case.
'Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 736. Although the Hanover Shoe Court had suggested
that the cost-plus contract might be only one of several situations in which passing-on could be
asserted, 392 U.S. at 494, the Illinois Brick Court declined to broaden the scope of possible
exceptions beyond the cost-plus contract, 431 U.S. at 745. For a discussion of the "cost-plus"
contract as it applies to Mid-West, see notes 48-49 and accompanying text infra.
27. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16. Arguably, the Court's refusal to
expand the exceptions in Illinois Brick can be confined to the context in which the statement
was made, and be understood as disallowing further exceptions only where market forces, rather
than corporate relationships, are the effective complicating factors. Id. at 736 n.16, 745.
The Third Circuit analogized to the suggested "control" exception, and permitted purchas-
ers from direct sellers-the direct sellers being owned by and having purchased from the
defendant-to offensively assert passing-on against the controlling price fixer. Stotter & Co. v.
Amstar Corp., 579 F.2d 13, 19 (3d Cir. 1978), noted in the Third Circuit Review, 24 VILL. L.
REV. 207 (1979).
28. 579 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1978).
[VOL. 25: p. 967
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recovery by indirect purchasers is inapplicable where the plaintiff purchased
directly from the defendant a product into which the defendant had incorpo-
rated a price-fixed ingredient.
2 9
In addition to requiring a plaintiff to show "injury" in order to recover
under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court requires that the
plaintiff have standing to sue, recognizing that injury alone does not neces-
sarily furnish standing. 30 The precise test for standing under section 4 has
not yet been delineated by the Court, 3 1 and lower courts have split in their
application of two basic approaches.3 2 Under the "direct injury" rule, the
antitrust plaintiff has standing if it is the immediate victim of the violator's
wrongdoing. 33 Under the "target area" rule, the plaintiff has standing if the
injury was in the area of the economy in which the violation occurred.
34
29. Id. at 18. In Stotter, the plaintiff, a direct purchaser of candy, beverage syrup, and
other products, brought suit against the defendant sugar refiner for allegedly fixing the price of
sugar in violation of § 4 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 15. The Third Circuit rejected the defend-
ant's argument that, although the plaintiff was a direct purchaser of the food products, it was
only an indirect purchaser of the allegedly price-fixed sugar. Id. at 15-16. Finding legal injury,
the court reasoned that, if plaintiff were precluded from suing, no one could recover the alleged
overcharge. Id. at 17-18. The court concluded that the need to prevent defendants from poten-
tially evading the antitrust laws by incorporating price-fixed items into other products before
sale outweighed the added complexity of determining what portion of the product's price was
due to the overcharge on the incorporated item. Id. For further discussion of Stotter, see Note,
supra note 27.
30. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 728 n.7. The Court stated that "the question of
which persons have been injured by an illegal overcharge for purposes of § 4 is analytically
distinct from the question of which persons have sustained injuries too remote to give them
standing to sue for damages under § 4." Id.
31. The Supreme Court has recognized that "lower courts have been virtually unanimous in
concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for
all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation." Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 n.14 (1972). As noted by the Ninth Circuit, "courts have impressed a
standing doctrine so as to confine the availability of section 4 relief only to those individuals
whose protection is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws." In re Multidistrict Vehicle
Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
The Supreme Court, however, has not yet reconciled the various approaches which lower courts
have taken to determine standing. See 481 F.2d at 126-27.
32. Compare Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 938 (1973) with Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977). For a discussion of the two approaches and a survey
of the positions of the various circuits, see In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No.
31, 481 F.2d 122, 126-30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). See generally Berger &
Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977). See also
notes 33-34 and accompanying text infra.
33. See, e.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 729-30 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383,
394-95 (6th Cir. 1962); Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299, 302-03
(D. Mass.), aff'd, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957).
34. See, e.g., Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1358-61 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L.
No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 127 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); South Carolina Coun-
cil of Milk Producers. Inc. v. Newton. 360 F.2d 414. 417-19 (4th Cir. 1966).
1979-1980]
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The Third Circuit has applied both approaches,3 5 proceeding on a case-by-
case basis3 6 designed "to preserve the effectiveness of the treble damage
remedy without overextending its availability." 
3 7
Unlike section 4 of the Clayton Act, which requires injury to business
or property, section 16 requires only "threatened loss or damage." 38 The
Supreme Court has suggested that the difference in language reflects the
different natures of the remedies-duplicative recoveries for treble damages
have a greater impact on a defendant than a single recovery while several
injunctions have no more effect than one.3 9
Although the Supreme Court has stated that "section 16 should be con-
strued and applied . . .with the knowledge that [equitable relief] is flexi-
ble," 40 no uniform policy has been developed by the circuits to determine
when a plaintiff has standing to sue under section 16.41 The Second and
Tenth Circuits have suggested that the same standard of injury is required
under section 16 as is required under section 4.42 In contrast, the Fifth
35. Compare Ash v. IBM, Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927
(1966) (stockholder of a corporation affected by defendant's alleged lessening of competition
denied standing on grounds that he suffered only indirect injury) and Loeb v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910) (under predecessor of § 4 of the Clayton Act) (stockholder and
creditor of corporation affected by defendant's alleged monopolistic practices denied standing on
ground that he suffered only indirect injury) with International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators
& Asbestos Workers v. United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384 (3rd Cir. 1973), modified, 494
F.2d 1353 (3d Cir. 1974) (unions held to have standing under "target area" rule in suit against
employee bargaining associations for allegedly conspiring to restrain trade and eliminate com-
petition).
36. See Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1954) (per curiam),
affg 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953). Having established a "direct injury" rule, the Third
Circuit later refused to adhere to a rigid analysis, agreeing with the district court that "[e]ach
case must be dealt with on its own facts." Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp.
312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1954).
Judge Gibbons recently summarized the Third Circuit's approach as "[recognizing] that § 4
standing analysis is essentially a balancing test comprised of many constant and variable factors
and that there is no talismatic test capable of resolving all § 4 standing problems." Bravman v.
Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823
(1978).
37. Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 508 (3d Cir. 1976).
38. For the pertinent text of §§ 4 and 16, see notes 3 & 4 supra.
39. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261-62 (1972). In Standard Oil, the State of
Hawaii sought damages and injunctive relief for injury to the State's commercial interests, to its
citizens' commercial interests, and to the State's economy in general due to the defendant's
alleged monopolization of the petroleum trade in violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at 254-56.
The Supreme Court, emphasizing that § 4 is notably different from § 16, held that it made little
difference whether injunctive relief was sought by the State in one or all of its capacities but
that damages were available only for injury to the State's business or property. Id. at 260-62.
40. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 131 (1969). The Supreme
Court held that, under § 16's "threatened" injury language, a plaintiff could obtain injunctive
relief under the traditional principles of equity without proving actual injury. Id. at 130.
41. Compare Nassau County Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 497 F.2d 1151,
1154 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974) (lack of standing under § 16 for same
reasons as under § 4) with In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d
122, 130-31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973) (§ 16 "varies significantly" from § 4
and has different standing requirements).
42. See, e.g., Nassau County Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 497 F.2d 1151,
1154 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974) (standing to sue for injunctive relief denied
[VOL. 25: p. 967
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Circuit permits standing under section 16 more freely than under section 4,
requiring a plaintiff to "show only that he is threatened by injury proxi-
mately caused by the defendant." 4 3  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit accords
section 16 standing under the principles of equity." In Bogus v. American
Speech & Hearing Association,4 5 the Third Circuit recently approved more
expansive standing under section 16 than under section 4, considering the
injunction to be better adapted to enforcement of the antitrust laws.46
In Mid-West, the Third Circuit confronted, for the first time since Il-
linois Brick, the issue of standing under either section 4 or section 16.
47
Relying on Illinois Brick, the court denied the indirect purchasers standing
under section 4, finding that they had failed to raise a genuine question 4 8 as
to whether there were preexisting, fixed-quantity, cost-plus contracts at each
level of distribution .4 Plaintiff's concession that it did not have fixed quan-
tity contracts was held to be dispositive 50 for the court refused to extend the
Illinois Brick cost-plus exception to informal arrangements.
51
The case as to plaintiff Mid-West, which purchased bags from a sub-
sidiary of defendant Continental Group, Inc. (Continental), was remanded
for same reasons as denied under § 4); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973) (standing denied without distinction between § 4
and § 16).
43. Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1174 (5th Cir. 1976) ("target area"
plaintiffs who had standing under § 4 necessarily had standing under the less demanding re-
quirements of § 16).
44. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 130-31 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973) (plaintiffs accorded standing under § 16 although out-
side § 4 "target area").
45. 582 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1978).
46. Id. at 288-89. The Third Circuit noted that the § 16 requirement of "threatened loss or
damage" constituted a lower threshold requirement than the § 4 requirement of proving "injury
to business or property." Id.
47. See 596 F.2d at 578. Noting the general applicability of the principles underlying the
Court's decision in Illinois Brick, the Third Circuit stated: "Illinois Brick not only addresses
the [standing of indirect purchasers], it also serves as a guidepost for future litigation. Accord-
ingly, we frame our response to the issues raised in this appeal with an eye toward blending
with and complementing the themes that have been accentuated by the High Court." Id.
48. The standard applied by the court for granting summary judgment is found in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure which state in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
49. 596 F.2d at 580. On appeal, plaintiff Shopping Cart argued that after discovery it might
have shown that pre-existing, cost-plus contracts existed. Id. at 579-80. The court, concerned
that a party with a weak claim might abuse discovery in order to wear down an adversary,
justified the use of summary judgment to achieve "prompt adjudication" where there is "no
genuine issue." Id. at 579.
50. See id. at 577 n.9.
51. Id. at 577 n.9. For a discussion of the effect of a cost-plus arrangement, see note 26
supra. Avoidance of the complexities of examining the terms of each sale, and insurance of an
incentive for direct purchasers to sue, provided justification for restricting the exception to
fixed-quantity contracts as suggested in Illinois Brick. 596 F.2d at 577 n.9, citing Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois. 431 U.S. at 736. 743-44.
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for factual determinations of whether the bags that Mid-West purchased
were consumer bags 52 and whether Continental was legally accountable for
its subsidiary's actions.5 3 The Third Circuit ruled that the plaintiff would
have standing against the parent corporation if it established 1) that the sub-
sidiary sold bags which were the subject of the price-fixing agreement 5 4 and
2) that the defendant parent corporation controlled its subsidiary's pricing
decisions.
55
Arguing that direct purchasers from competitors ought to have standing
to bring treble damage actions, plaintiff Murray's of Baederwood, Inc. (Mur-
ray's) claimed that the defendants' competitors were able to artificially inflate
prices because the price-fixing conspiracy raised the general market price. 56
The court denied standing, however, noting that "the law has not allowed all
of those merely affected by the ripples created by antitrust violations to sue
for treble damages."
57
Rather than relying upon the "direct injury"58 or the "target area"
rule, 5 9 the Mid-West court applied three major policy considerations
suggested by the Supreme Court in the earlier injury and passing-on cases. 60
52. 596 F.2d at 588.
53. Id. at 589. Further factual determinations were necessary because the district court did
not indicate on which of two grounds it had granted summary judgment for the defendant. Id.
at 588. Continental had argued that its subsidiary manufactured kraft or paper bags, rather than
consumer bags, and also that Mid-West, having purchased from the subsidiary, had not pur-
chased the bags directly from the defendant. Id. at 587-89.
54. Id. at 588. The court indicated that Continental's liability would be determined by the
characteristics of the bags its subsidiary manufactured and not, as argued by defendant, by. the
name given to the bags. Id.
55. Id. at 589. In order to recover from Continental, Mid-West would have to prove that
Continental dominated its subsidiary to such an extent that the subsidiary's pricing was part of
the price-fixing conspiracy. Id. See also note 7 supra. The court rejected Mid-West's argument
that, under Stotter, the subsidiary was simply the alter ego of the defendant corporation, distin-
guishing the position of Mid-West on the ground that the defendant parent corporation had not
made "intra-company" sales prior to the public sales in an attempt to insulate the parent by
virtue of its alleged status as an indirect seller, and on the ground that the Stotter subsidiary
was apparently not involved in the price fixing. 596 F.2d at 589. In Mid-West, the court noted
that the Continental subsidiary might itself be subject to suit if it was, in fact, involved in the
price-fixing scheme. Id. For a brief discussion of Stotter, see note 27 supra.
56. 596 F.2d at 580-81. For an explanation of Murray's position as a direct purchaser from
defendants' competitor, see note 6 supra.
In the only case in which a plaintiff has successfully sought standing to sue for damages
from overcharges paid to defendant's competitors, the court applied the "target area" test and
found the sales by nonconspirators to be "clearly within the area of the economy in which
competitive conditions allegedly disintegrated." Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co.,
280 F. Supp. 802, 807 (W.D. Wash. 1968) (defendants' conspiracy created price-fixing "um-
brella").
57. 596 F.2d at 581, quoting John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495,
499 (9th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added).
58. For a discussion of the "direct injury" rule, see note 33 and accompanying text supra.
59. For a discussion of the "target area" rule, see note 34 and accompanying text supra.
60. 596 F.2d at 582-83. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). The Third Circuit justified its reliance on these Supreme
Court cases, stating that "although 'analytically distinct' from standing, [injury and passing-on]
are nevertheless related in that they, too, implicate the enforcement of the antitrust laws." 596
F.2d at 582, quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 728 n.7.
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Concerned about the potential complexity of proof, the Third Circuit noted
that "it would be almost impossible, and at the very least unwieldy,"61 for
plaintiffs to isolate and trace from among the many factors influencing a
competitor's pricing decisions the effects of the artificially higher market
price. 62 Additionally, the Mid-West court determined that effective en-
forcement of the antitrust laws could be accomplished "for all practical pur-
poses" by limiting standing to the defendant price fixer's direct purchasers.
6 3
Finally, the court found that expansion of standing, making a defendant sub-
ject to potentially ruinous industrywide liability, would be contrary to the
goal of maintaining competition which underlies the antitrust laws.
64
Injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act is, as noted by the
Mid-West court, generally more broadly available than are treble damages
under section 4.65 Because there is no danger of duplicative recoveries, and
because complex analysis and tracing of the overcharge are unnecessary, the
court concluded that Illinois Brick is not controlling with respect to requests
for injunctive relief.66
61. 596 F.2d at 584. The court found the position of purchasers from competitors of the
defendants analogous to that of indirect purchasers in that both face the same difficulty of trac-
ing their injury from the defendant through the distribution chain to a third party. Id.
62. Id. The Third Circuit saw little reason to expand the standing doctrine in a manner
which would require oppressively complex economic analysis. Id. at 585. According to the
majority, a purchaser from a competitor must establish not only that a price-fixing umbrella was
created, but also that "[plaintiff's] supplier would have sold to it at a lower price had the
conspiracy not existed." Id. at 584 n.45. In addition to market price, factors such as cost of
production, operating efficiency, market strategy, elasticity of demand, and interchangeability of
products make any attempt to isolate the effect of the price fixing "highly conjectural." Id. at
584.
The court answered the dissent's argument that the proceeding would be no more complex
than it would be had the plaintiff purchased directly from the defendant by noting that the
purposes of the analyses were different. Id. at 585-86 n.49. Since injury to those purchasing
directly from defendants is apparent, economic data is only necessary for the estimation of
damages. Id. Purchasers from competitors, however, must prove injury "with reasonable
certainty"-a requirement which, according to the majority, involves specific and precise de-
terminations of the effect and impact of the defendant's illegal conduct. Id.
63. Id. at 585, citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 745-46. The court noted that
providing standing to direct purchasers from competitors would fill a potential gap in the anti-
trust enforcement scheme in the event that direct purchasers from defendants fail to sue their
suppliers; however, the court, decided that, on balance, the benefit was outweighed by the
difficulty in tracing damage and the risk of ruinous liability. 596 F.2d at 585 n.48.
64. 596 F.2d at 586-87. Although noting the seriousness of the per se price-fixing violation,
the Mid-West court was reluctant to permit the treble damage action to become a destructive
force by extending defendants' liability to gains earned by their competitors which defendants
never received. Id. For a discussion of price fixing as a per se violation of the antitrust laws, see
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
65. 596 F.2d at 591. See also id. at 590-92. The Mid-West court contrasted the language of
§ 16 with the more restrictive language of § 4, noting that § 16 provides relief for "threatened
loss or damage" rather than solely for injury already sustained, injunctive relief is not limited to
"business or property," and, most significantly, injunctive relief is available under and according
to principles of equity rather than of law. Id. at 591. For differing judicial applications of § 16,
see notes 40-46 and accompanying text supra.
66. 596 F.2d at 592. Defendants argued that if, according to Illinois Brick, an indirect
purchaser is not "injured" under § 4, then neither is he threatened with injury under § 16. Id.
at 590. The Third Circuit noted, however, that since Illinois Brick was not decided on grounds
of standing, and did not concern § 16, it was not controlling. Id. at 592.
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Noting that, under actual market conditions, indirect purchasers will
always have part of the illegal overcharge passed on to them, 67 the court
found that indirect purchasers 68 have section 16 standing since the
threatened damage is caused by the defendant's price-fixing scheme.69 The
majority also reasoned that antitrust enforcement would be augmented by
allowing any individual threatened with loss to bring suit for injunctive re-
lief.
70
Judge Higginbotham, dissenting in part, 71 insisted that denying direct
purchasers from defendants' competitors standing to sue for treble damages
would not advance the competitive, deterrent, and compensatory aims of the
antitrust laws. 72 Arguing that the primary purpose of antitrust damage relief
is remedial rather than punitive, 73 the dissent emphasized that the majority's
limitation on standing would cause actual injuries to go uncompensated. 74
Furthermore, because purchasers from defendants' competitors are not
within defendants' chain of distribution, recovery would not be duplicative. 75
Applying the direct injury test, Judge Higginbotham maintained that the
injuries suffered by these particular plaintiffs were "reasonably foresee-
67. Id. at 593. For this reason, the court found it unnecessary to define the outer limits of
standing under § 16. Id.
68. Should defendant Continental not be legally accountable for its subsidiary's sales, then
plaintiff Mid-West would be a direct purchaser from a competitor and might have standing to
sue the parent corporation for injunctive relief. Id. at 590 n.63. Finding the direct purchaser
issue both premature and unbriefed by the parties, however, the court considered only the
indirect purchasers' suits for injunctive relief. Id.
69. Id. at 593-94. Although held to have standing under § 16, each indirect purchaser must
still establish its right to relief. Id. at 594.
70. Id. at 593. Affording standing to indirect purchasers fills the antitrust enforcement gap
created if neither the government nor direct purchasers bring suit. Id. In addition, if standing
for injunctive actions were available only to the government and direct purchasers, those less
directly, but no less effectively, injured would have no means for relief. Id. Inclusive standing
under § 16, the court reasoned, provides a remedy for those indirectly injured, without creating
the problems of complexity and duplicative recovery which could arise if similar standing were
accorded in treble damage actions under § 4. Id.
71. 596 F.2d at 595 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part).
72. Id. Note that the dissent considered the same objectives as did the majority but disa-
greed with the majority as to their relative importance. Id.
73. Id., citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977).
The Brunswick Court recognized the importance of treble damages as both a penalty and a
deterrent. 429 U.S. at 485.
74. 596 F.2d at 596 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part). Allowing standing would also
prevent the risk of nonenforcement should the defendants' direct purchasers choose not to sue
for fear of endangering their source of supply. Id.
75. Id. at 595, 598 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part). Interpreting the Illinois Brick
limitation to be applicable to direct purchasers in all chains of distribution, Judge Higgin-
botham argued that, because standing is restricted to direct purchasers, there would be no
problem in apportioning the overcharge between direct and indirect purchasers and no reduced
incentive to sue. Id. at 598 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part). The added complexity alone,
he argued, was insufficient to deny competitors' direct purchasers standing to sue. See id. at
598-99 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part).
In response to the majority's contention that defendants could be subjected to ruinous
liability if their competitors' direct purchasers were afforded standing, Judge Higginbotham con-
cluded that defendants large enough to influence competitors' prices would not likely be ruined
by large recoveries. Id. at 598 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part).
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able." 76 Moreover, employing the target area test, Judge Higginbotham
stated that these purchasers were "well within the area of economy
threatened by defendants' price-fixing activities" 77 because competitors were
likely to raise their prices in response to defendants' price increase. 78
The Third Circuit's refusal to extend standing under section 4 to indi-
rect purchasers with informal, cost-plus contracts for unfixed quantities of
goods is consistent with the Illinois Brick Court's explicit reluctance to ex-
pand the cost-plus exception. 79 Similarly, the remand concerning defendant
Continental's liability for the sales of its subsidiary conforms with Illinois
Brick and the Supreme Court's limitation of section 4 standing to direct
purchasers 80
If Illinois Brick undeniably stood for the proposition that the objectives
of the treble damage action are entirely fulfilled when defendants' direct
purchasers recover for the defendants' overcharge, the Mid-West court's de-
nial of standing to competitors' direct purchasers would also be unassail-
able.8 ' It is submitted, however, that the dissent's conclusion that the Su-
preme Court did not find that only direct purchasers from price fixers could
recover is consistent with the Court's holding in Illinois Brick.8 2 That
76. Id. at 597 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part). According to the dissent, directness of
injury is determined by proximate cause, and privity is not necessarily required. Id. at 596
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part). The dissent argued that the defendants proximately
caused plaintiffs' injury because it was reasonably foreseeable that competitors would raise their
prices under defendants' price-fixing "umbrella." Id. at 597 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in
part). Judge Higginbotham noted that the Third Circuit, as well as other courts, had previously
addressed the standing issue in terms of proximate cause. Id. at 596 & n.9 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting in part), citing Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277, 284 (3d
Cir. 1978); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 447 n.6 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978).
77. 596 F.2d at 597 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part).
78. Id. The dissent admitted that plaintiffs would not meet the Second Circuit's target area
test which requires that a plaintiff be "aimed at." Id. at 597 n.ll (Higginbotham, J., dissenting
in part). See Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292,
1296 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). Judge Higginbotham noted, however,
that the Third Circuit does not use this standard, further commenting that the "aimed at" test is
too restrictive to serve the antitrust laws' aims of compensation and deterrence. 596 F.2d at 597
n.1l (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part). Judge Higginbotham advocated broad liability to
deter and punish per se violations of the antitrust laws. Id. at 597 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting
in part).
79. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra.
80. See note 15 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of why plaintiff Mid-West
does not fit within the Stotter exception for parent-subsidiary alter ego relationships, see note
55 supra.
81. See 596 F.2d at 585. Illinois Brick, in which the Court concluded that enforcement of
the antitrust laws is better facilitated by permitting direct purchasers to recover the full amount
of the overcharge than by apportioning the damages at each level of the distribution chain,
factually involved only purchasers from the defendants, not from defendants' competitors. See
431 U.S. at 745-47; note 23 and accompanying text supra. See also note 15 and accompanying
text supra.
82. See 596 F.2d at 596 n.6. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part). The Illinois Brick Court
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Court, in denying defendants' indirect purchasers standing by prohibiting
the offensive use of passing-on, did not suggest that direct purchasers out-
side a defendant's chain of distribution could not bring suit. 83 Furthermore,
because they are direct purchasers, purchasers from defendants' competitors
would not be asserting that their injury was a result of passing on, the issue
addressed in Illinois Brick. 84 Finally, and most significantly, by analyzing
the case in terms of complexity, deterrence, and preservation of competi-
tion, the Mid-West court did not rely on its own more expansive interpreta-
tion of Illinois Brick to deny standing but, instead, employed a balancing
test approach.
85
Since Mid-West involved purchasers outside the defendants' chain of
distribution rather than purchasers from within, all of the above-mentioned
policy considerations did not favor restricting standing as they did in Illinois
Brick.s86 Here, complexity was arguably at least as much of a concern be-
cause both direct purchasers' and competitors' pricing decisions involve
numerous factors which affect tracing an overcharge.8 7 Further, it is submit-
ted, that the potential for industrywide liability was as least as prohibitive as
was the potential for "passed on" duplicative recovery in Illinois Brick.8 8
Weighing against restricting standing, however, was the fact that the deter-
rence policy would not be affected at all by affording competitors' direct pur-
chasers standing because they are in a different chain of distribution than
83. See note 24 and accompanying text supra. The Third Circuit correctly noted that, while
the Illinois Brick Court recognized that direct purchasers may not always sue their suppliers,
the Court did not consider filling this gap by permitting competitors' purchasers to sue. 596
F.2d at 585 n.48. The Supreme Court's failure to speak, however, is just as well explained by
the fact that the issue has not yet been argued before the Court.
84. Since direct purchasers from competitors are at the top of the distribution chain, they
would be asserting direct injury from the overcharge. For a discussion of the passing-on theory,
see notes 16-24 and accompanying text supra.
85. See notes 58-64 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 89 and accompanying text infra.
87. See notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
88. Ruinous liability and multiple liability both affect the preservation of competition but
the concepts are distinguishable: ruinous liability is a concern if defendants are held liable for
their competitors' overcharges; multiple liability would occur if offensive, but not defensive,
assertion of passing-on were permitted so that different plaintiffs within a chain of distribution
could recover for the same overcharges. See note 24 supra.
Multiple as well as ruinous liability could be a factor in Mid-West since, as the majority
acknowledges, the Supreme Court has not yet considered or prohibited the offensive assertion
of passing-on in the context of a competitor's chain of distribution. 596 F.2d at 580 n.24. The
dissent, on the other hand, felt that the direct purchaser limitation would definitely apply. Id.
at 598 n.13. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part). See note 75 supra.
It is submitted that competitors' direct purchasers may be more likely to seek recovery
than indirect purchasers more than one step removed in the defendant's chain of distribution
since the former are fewer steps removed from the price fixer and are more likely to have a
greater stake in the outcome of the suit. In addition, it is suggested that joining the potential
plaintiffs within a distribution chain to apportion the overcharges within that chain will not
protect defendants from ruinous liability within several distribution chains. For a discussion of
the use of joinder, see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 737-41.
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defendants' direct purchasers; therefore, defendants' direct purchasers' re-
covery and incentive to sue would not be hindered. 89
Notwithstanding the fact that the relevant policy considerations did not
uniformly weigh in favor of restricting standing, 90 it is suggested that the
Mid-West court's denial of standing to competitors' direct purchasers is not
wholly inconsistent with Illinois Brick and the Third Circuit's earlier deci-
sion in Stotter. In light of the Supreme Court's emphasis on avoiding com-
plexity and preserving competition, 91 the added deterrent arguably does not
outweigh the complexity and the potentially ruinous liability inherent in al-
lowing competitors' purchasers to sue. 92  In contrast, the Third Circuit's will-
ingness to accept added complexity in Stotter was not caused by a desire to
increase deterrence but, rather, was intended to ensure that defendant price
fixers would be subject to suit since plaintiffs as direct purchasers were the
only parties who had standing under Illinois Brick.
93
It is submitted that the Third Circuit properly rejected the defendants'
contention that Illinois Brick should control the inquiry into section 16
standing. 94 The difference in language between the two provisions seems to
clearly indicate that different persons are entitled to bring suit under section
16 than are allowed under section 4.95 Furthermore, because injunctions do
not involve the drawbacks of complexity and duplicative or ruinious liability
posed by treble damage actions, injunctive relief is a more effective en-
forcement mechanism when these dangers are present.
96
89. Allowing competitors' direct purchasers to sue would have actually encouraged private
enforcement of the antitrust laws by extending the recovery incentive. 596 F.2d at 596 (Higgin-
botham, J., dissenting in part). As the dissent pointed out, extension of standing to competitors'
direct purchasers would fill the enforcement gap created when direct purchasers from defend-
ants do not bring suit. Id. Admittedly, according purchasers from competitors standing might
indirectly affect direct purchasers' recoveries if defendants have limited assets. It is submitted,
however, that such a consideration would also increase a direct purchaser's incentive to sue in
order to ensure recovery of his share.
90. See notes 87-89 and accompanying text supra.
91. See Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958); note 24 and accom-
panying text supra.
92. The Supreme Court has singled out direct purchasers as the parties in defendant's chain
of distribution to enforce the antitrust laws. See note 15 and accompanying text supra. Although
this fact does not necessarily exclude all other plaintiffs, it is submitted that a greater shift in
the weight accorded to the decisive factors is necessary before expanded standing will be recog-
nized.
93. Stotter & Co. v. Amstar Corp., 579 F.2d at 18. The Stotter court noted that to allow
the defendant to avoid treble damage actions by simply incorporating the price-fixed item into
another product "would leave a gaping hole in the administration of the antitrust laws." Id.
94. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
95. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) with id. § 26. For the text of the pertinent language of
§ 4 and 16, see notes 3 & 4 supra. Both the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit had
previously noted the difference in language. See notes 38-41 & 45-46 and accompanying text
supra. Courts which have not distinguished between § 4 and § 16 for purposes of standing have
refrained from mentioning the difference in language between the two sections. See note 42 and
accompanying text supra.
96. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra. The Mid-West court's according of § 16
standing to indirect purchasers is consistent with its decision under § 4 since deterrence can be
achieved without added complexity. On balance, the deterrence factor favors expanded stand-
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The Third Circuit in Mid-West has, it is submitted, limited section 4
standing to direct purchasers from defendants. 97 Any exception to this re-
striction apparently depends on a showing that such standing is necessary for
deterrence of antitrust violators or that it can be accomplished without addi-
tional complexity. 98
Although the Third Circuit has approved the use of injunctive relief by
indirect purchasers from defendants as further protection against antitrust
violations, 99 it should be noted that Mid-West applies only to defendants'
indirect purchasers from whom, the court conceded, money is passing to the
defendants. 100 It is suggested that, in light of the added deterrence which
would result, competitors' purchasers should similarly have section 16 stand-
ing since defendants' price fixing "threatens" damage due to the competitors'
potential for increasing prices.
Robert C. Mickle
ing, while complexity and preserving competition are not affected since injury does not have to
be proved. Although permitting indirect purchasers to sue under § 16 expands the group of
plaintiffs who may deter antitrust violators, it is submitted that the additional deterrence is not
significant because, in reality, numerous injunctions are no more effective than one.
97. By denying standing to competitors' direct purchasers, the court has effectively elimi-
nated everyone outside the defendants' chain of distribution since it is unlikely, after Illinois
Brick and the instant case, that indirect purchasers from defendants' competitors will seek, or
be granted, § 4 standing.
98, See notes 26-29 & 95 and accompanying text supra.
99. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
100. 596 F.2d at 593.
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